The success of an auction design often hinges on its ability to set parameters such as reserve price and bid levels that will maximize an objective function such as the auctioneer revenue. Works on designing adaptive auction mechanisms have emerged recently, and the challenge is in learning different auction parameters by observing the bidding in previous auctions. In this paper, we propose a non-parametric method for determining discrete bid levels dynamically so as to maximize the auctioneer revenue. First, we propose a non-parametric kernel method for estimating the probabilities of closing price with past auction data. Then a greedy strategy has been devised to determine the discrete bid levels based on the estimated probability information of closing price. We show experimentally that our non-parametric method is robust to changes in parameters such as the distributions of participating bidders as well as the individual bidder evaluation, and it consistently outperforms different competitors with various settings with respect to auctioneer revenue maximization.
INTRODUCTION
Online internet auction is becoming an important and popular mechanism in electronic commerce. The prevalence Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. of online auctions in major platforms such as ebay and Amazon has spawned interesting research problems for agentmediated auctions [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] .
Previous research has shown that parameters such as reserve price, minimum bid increments, and bidder valuation distribution greatly affect the auction outcome. Hence, much attention has been given to design techniques that can learn or tune the aforementioned parameters so as to maximize auctioneer revenue, which include [6, 7, 8] for setting the discrete bid levels, and [9] for determining the reserve price. Rogers et al [6] proposed a powerful model for determining optimal discrete bid levels both numerically and analytically, and provided some specific forms of distributions on bidder valuation or number of bidders. However, in some scenarios, the underlying data distribution could not be identified easily, or may be identified wrongly due to the presence of noise or outlier in the data that distort the true data distribution. Another problem of their model (along with many others in the literature) is poor flexibility, in the sense that they adhere to the parameter values computed, and naturally the performance will deteriorate in dynamic settings where the bidder valuation distribution may change in successive auctions (rendering the parameter values invalid).
An adaptive auction is one that learns to adjust parameter values dynamically in response to past empirical bidder behavior so as to maximize an objective function such as the auctioneer revenue. Specifically, through observing previous auction results, assumptions (such as the specific form of bidder valuation distributions) are made for the constructed model, in order to work out the desired parameters that will be used in the successive auctions.
The objective of our work is to devise a method to efficiently and adaptively compute bid levels that seeks to maximize the auctioneer revenue, taking into consideration possible change of bidder valuation from one auction to the next. The motivation behind our proposed scheme are that in real world applications, (1) it is often difficult if not impossible to estimate bidder valuation distribution accurately, and preassumptions do not always comply to the real distribution of bidder valuation; and (2) bidder valuation distribution may change during repeated auctions, in view of the changing supply and demand relation of the item that is being auctioned. Consider the following scenario. Suppose 10 units of an item are being auctioned, and bidder valuation is $10 in average; during the course of auctions, news is released that there will be 100 more such items to be auctioned, thus the average bidder valuation may drop to $8 due to sudden surge in supply. This kind of distribution change during auction cannot be handled by existing schemes, since they pre-assume a specific form of bidder valuation distribution (e.g., normal, exponential, uniform etc) and adhere throughout the whole auction until such items are sold out. Aiming to deal with above problems, our scheme consists of two steps: first, we accurately estimate the probability distribution of closing price (i.e. the probability that an auction will close on a specific price level); second, we determine the bid levels that will in turn be used for successive auctions based on the result of the first step. Our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a non-parametric method based on kernel function for estimating probability of closing price. This method is well-known in statistical machine learning for its accurate and robust probability density estimation when there is little or no information about the data distribution or there are noises contained in the data.
• Based on the estimated probability distribution of the closing price, we then devise a simple greedy heuristic strategy for choosing the bid levels so as to maximize the auctioneer revenue.
• We conduct a series of detailed experiments over various settings, and results show that our method consistently outperforms others in terms of average revenue.
In particular, the kernel method can well model the underlying distribution of the data without knowing the exact distribution form of the data beforehand; furthermore, it performs better than other methods in situations where the bidder valuation distribution changes as the auction proceeds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief review of related work is given in Section 2. After that, we present the auction mechanism followed by our method for deriving bid levels in Section 3. Detailed experimental results are presented in Section 4. Finally we conclude the paper in section 5.
RELATED WORK
In this paper we consider the context of English auction with discrete bid levels. The problem of investigating the optimal discrete bid levels has been studied in [6, 7, 8] . Rothkopf et al [8] considered the question of determining the optimal number and distribution of bid levels, and discussed how discrete bid levels affect auctioneer expected revenue. In particular, two different distributions of bidder valuation, namely uniform and exponential, are analyzed and results show that evenly spaced bid levels are found to be the optimal in case of uniform bidder valuation; whereas the optimal bid increment was shown to increase as the auction proceeds. Rogers et al [6, 7] extended the work of [8] by designing a general analysis on the relation between revenue and discrete bid levels implemented. Optimal results for bid levels can be determined numerically through their model. Meanwhile, Bayesian inference was adopted for estimating the number and valuation distribution of the bidders through observing the closing price of previous auctions. Models proposed in these work rely on pre-specified assumptions, such as the number of participating bidder and their valuations follow some kind of distributions, in order to work out the optimal bid level parameters. These assumptions, however, are not always easily satisfied for modeling the data in real world applications. For example, bidder valuation distribution may change significantly as the auction proceeds, or the exact form of underlying distribution is simply complicated to determine.
Recently, non-parametric statistical techniques have emerged to address problems of distribution estimation. These modelindependent techniques can work well in modeling the underlying distribution, with little even no knowledge about the nature of the data. Bichler et al [10] devised a nonparametric method for estimating reserve prices in procurement auctions. The method is based on a kernel density estimator and uses an order statistics to derive the optimal reserve price, so as to maximize the auctioneer revenue. In contrast to traditional auction theory, the authors use the bidder's risk statement for getting a winning bid as a key criterion to set an optimal reserve price. The reserve price for a given probability can then be derived from the distribution function of the observed drop-out bids.
Similar work on learning reserve price was proposed by Pardoe et al [9] , who explored the problem of adaptive auction mechanism design using techniques from machine learning. Their observation is that many existing auction mechanisms are relying on model assumptions and sometimes the analytic process for the model is so complicated that the optimal mechanism cannot be obtained efficiently. To address this challenge, a metalearning scheme is proposed which can identify the parameters, over past data of bidder behavior, affecting some objective function (e.g., auctioneer revenue) when the bidder behavior is unknown. Specifically, they model the choice of optimal reserve price among a set of possible values as the k-armed bandit problem, which can be solved efficiently using SoftMax or -greedy strategy [11, 12] . They also employ the Bayesian inference technique to compute the optimal reserve price based on distributional information of a bidder population that are available in advance. Other research literature related to auction mechanism design includes theoretical work on online learning for online auctions [3, 13] .
Inspired from the above works, our approach is a nonparametric technique based on a kernel method for estimating the distribution of the closing price. Based on the estimated closing price probability, we propose a simple greedy strategy to determine the bid levels such that the revenue is maximized. The merits of utilizing a non-parametric technique is that it is robust and accurate for distribution estimation even there are noises and outliers in the data. And in case of change in the bidder valuation over successive auctions, our scheme is able to capture the distribution change and propose bid levels accordingly.
AUCTION MODEL AND KERNEL ESTI-MATOR BASED METHOD
In this section we present the context of our study -the English auction scenario. We then present our proposed kernel method to estimate the distribution of closing price. A greedy strategy is then presented for choosing bid levels based on the estimated distribution of closing price.
English Auction Scenario Defined
We consider an ascending English auction setting that was also used in [6, 8] : there is a risk neutral auctioneer, maximum b number of risk neutral bidders, and n identical (or not necessarily identical, but similar) items which are being sold one unit at a time to bidders by the auctioneer. Associated with each bidder valuation is a continuous probability density function f (x) within the range [Vmin, Vmax] , where Vmin (Vmax) is the lower (upper) bound of bidder valuation. Assume there are m+1 discrete bid levels, starting at l0 and ending at lm, and Vmin ≤ l0 < ... < lm ≤ Vmax. The bidders participate in an ascending price auction, each of which can propose bids that are restricted to the discrete bid levels. The auction starts with the auctioneer announcing the first discrete bid level (basically the first bid level is the reserve price of the auction), and check whether there are bidders who are willing to pay this amount. If there is no bidder willing to pay within a predetermined and publicly-announced time interval, the auction closes and the item remains unsold. If a bid is received, the auction continues and the auctioneer again check bidders' willingness to pay the next bid level. If no bidders are willing to pay this new price, the auction then closes and the item is sold to the current highest bidder. The selling price is called the closing price of the auction. This is called a round of the auction, and the auction continues from one round to the next. Suppose the closing price is li in round i, then the auctioneer revenue in this round is (li − l0). Previous work builds up an analytic model, in which the closing price distribution is computed at first based on some assumptions such as distributions of bidder valuation and number of participating bidders, and then bid levels are determined based the computed closing price distribution as well as the assumptions [6, 7] . However, these models are complicated to solve and highly sensitive to incorrect assumptions, which, in turn, will affect the auctioneer average revenue by providing poor bid levels.
Given the above auction setting, we suppose there are W (W ≥ m + 1) distinct values in [Vmin, Vmax] for the auctioneer to choose from, that is, the input is given as vi ∈ [Vmin, Vmax] for i = 1, ..., W , and vi = vj for i = j. Then our problem can be formulated as an optimization problem that chooses as bid levels m + 1 distinct values from among these W values such that the total auctioneer revenue is maximized.
Estimating the PDF of Closing Price
After a certain number of auction rounds, the auctioneer may begin to observe the previous closing prices, i.e. check how many times the auction closed at a specific price level for each of the W price levels. The closing price is crucial to the auctioneer revenue, which is a function of the bidder valuation [6, 8] . However the bidder valuation distribution is usually secret or unknown to the auctioneer, the auctioneer may only observe the publicly known closing prices of the previous auction rounds so that he can revise bid levels accordingly in subsequent auctions.
In this section, we will estimate the probability density function (PDF) of the closing price using a non-parametric method, specifically the kernel density estimation technique. The advantages of the non-parametric method over parametric method in density estimation are that (1) it requires less pre-assumptions about the data, and (2) it can provide robust estimation results with respect to existence of noises or outliers in the data [14] .
Suppose the closing price x, with observation falling within [Vmin, Vmax] , is a random variable with an unknown probability density function f (.), and there are n observations x1, x2, ..., xn obtained from previous closing prices. Here xi ∈ {vj}, i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ..., W . The kernel density estimator f (x) for the estimation of the probability density value at point (a specific closing price) xi is defined as
where K(.) is the kernel function and h the bandwidth, which is smoothing parameter to control the degree of smoothing applied to the data. The above kernel estimator is also known as the Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel density estimator [14] , and is a popular statistical curve estimation technique.
Mathematically, a kernel function is designed such that it must satisfy the following: (1) it is non-negative; and (2)
There are various kernel functions available, the commonly used kernel functions include the standard Gaussian function:
and the uniform function:
The PDF of the closing price is then obtained through the kernel estimator, which provides information on how likely the auction will be closed at a specific price level for each of the W distinct price levels, given the current bidder population. In some cases, the valuation distribution of the same bidder population may change over time. This may be caused by factors such as bidder's change of interest, or supplies and demands of the item being auctioned. Modeling changes of valuation distribution is almost impossible for existing auction models [6, 7] , since these models simply do not know from what time the bidder valuation changes. Thus they will adhere to obsolete assumptions (e.g., on bidder valuation distribution) instead of making adjustment to the new valuation distribution. One possible way for detecting valuation change is to apply statistical goodness-of-fit test on the previous closing price data, and a departure of the test result from pre-assumed distribution means that the bidder valuation may have changed. The kernel method, however, can detect bidder valuation change accordingly as the auction proceeds, since at the start of each round the kernel estimator will be invoked to calculate the newly PDF of the closing price. The change of bidder valuation will immediately reflect on the closing price.
Greedy Heuristic for Setting Bid Levels
Having obtained the PDF of closing price, the auctioneer is in a position to devise the bid levels so that his revenue is maximized in subsequent auctions. One might utilize the scheme in [6] that solves an optimization problem based on the estimated PDF of closing price. In this section we will propose a simple greedy strategy to choose bid levels, which is easy to implement, and also performs well in various simulation settings (as shown in Section 4).
Expected Revenue Increase. Consider the auction setting introduced in Section 3.1, where there is a risk neutral auctioneer, maximum number of b risk neutral bidders and n identical (or similar) items. Recall that the bidder valuation falls within [Vmin, Vmax] , and there are m+1 discrete bid levels each of which takes a value from W distinct price levels. The auctioneer determines the m + 1 bid levels one by one before the auction round start. When determining bid level li, in order to indicate which of the W price levels can be chosen for li we define the Expected Revenue Increase (ERI). Essentially, our greedy strategy relies on ERI for choosing bid levels. For ease of discussion, we use figures (see Figure  1 ) to show how to compute the ERI for each price level.
In Figure 1 , suppose there are three price levels vi, vj and v k chosen as bid levels. Note that the price levels chosen in order may not necessarily correspond to bid levels in ascending order. For example, in Figure 1 vi is chosen as a bid level at first, followed by vj choosing as another bid level and finally v k is determined as the last bid level. However, the final bid levels are l0 = v k , l1 = vi and l2 = vj, in which the order of bid levels are different to the order of price levels chosen. Now consider there is no bid level chosen (see Figure  1(a) ), for bidders with valuations falling within [Vmin, Vmax] , the auction will close with item unsold. So the revenue is 0. Suppose we are examining whether vi could be chosen as a first bid level Figure 1(b) . We then calculate the resulting goodness if vi is indeed chosen as a bid level, which is given as:
Here vL (vR) is the immediate left (right) price level that has been chosen as bid level, in case there is no immediate left (right) price level has been chosen as bid level, we define vL = Vmin (vR = Vmax). f (V ) is the probability density value, estimated through the kernel method, at price level V . The intuition behind this sum is that if there are bidders whose valuations fall within [vi, Vmax] , the auction will close at vi, and the expected revenue increase for setting vi as bid level would be the product of absolute revenue increase (vi − vL) and the closing probabilities of the price levels between [vi, Vmax] . Since we do not know bidder valuation distribution exactly, we just take into account the probabilities of all the price levels (which correspond to closing prices that are functionally dependent on bidder valuation distribution) falling within [vi, Vmax] as an indicator of goodness if setting vi as a bid level. Note that in an auction round all the bid levels are required to be distinctly chosen from W price levels in m + 1 steps, thus a price level V that has been chosen as a bid level at step t will not be examined again in step t + 1, t ∈ [1, m] . After vi is chosen as a bid level, the ERI of next price level being examined, i.e., vj, is then calculated as see Figure 1 (c):
where vL = vi and vR = Vmax. Similarly, after vj is determined as a second bid level, we obtain the ERI of v k as see Figure 1 (d): 
where vL (vR) is the immediate left (right) price level that has been chosen as bid level. In case there is no immediate left (right) price level has been chosen as bid level, we define vL = Vmin (vR = Vmax). Greedy Heuristic for Choosing Bid Levels. Having computed the expected revenue increase (ERI), we can now devise a greedy method to determine the bid levels. Suppose we are to determine m bid levels for an auction round (note we set l0 = Vmin as reserve price, thus there are m bid levels need to determine), we perform the selection process in m steps with each step a price level is determined as a bid level. Specifically, at first step, we examine the W price levels by calculating their ERI according to Equation 2, respectively. The price level with maximum ERI value is chosen as a first bid level. Note that this price level will not be examined again in the next m steps. At second step, the ERI of the rest W − 1 price levels are calculated, again, the price level with largest ERI is chosen as a second bid level. This process repeats until all the m bid levels are determined. The auctioneer then adopts these m bid levels during the auction (along with the reserve price l0 = Vmin), and announces them in turn (from l0 all the way to lm if possible). When the auction finishes, the closing price is recorded as history data, on which the kernel method will be performed in order to compute the new probability density of the closing prices that is used for the next round.
Mathematically, at each step in determining bid levels, a price level V is chosen as a bid level if it yields the largest ERI value, that is:
Hence, at the begin of an auction round, the m bid levels are determined one by one through greedily picking the price level with the largest ERI in each step. The greedy method Input: Closing price data of previous round, a set V with W price levels 1. Estimate probability density of Closing Price f (V ) using kernel method 2. l = {} 3. For i = 1 to m 4.
For vj ∈ {V − l} 5.
Compute ERI(vj) 6. li = arg maxv j {ERI(vj)} 7.
l = l ∪ li Output: m bid levels li ∈ l Figure 2 : Algorithm for Setting Bid Levels is simple and intuitive in nature, however in most applications the greedy method can produce near-optimal solution to the problem. The algorithm for our kernel estimator based method for choosing optimal bid levels is outlined in Figure 2 . Note we set l0 = Vmin as reserve price, so there are only m bid levels to determine. To begin an auction round, the algorithm is executed first to estimate probability density of the closing price, followed by the greedy method to compute the bid levels. These bid levels are announced in turn, iterate until no bidder is willing to pay the specific bid level, and the round is complete. The closing price is then recorded as closing price data for the next round.
The intuition for using the ERI as a measure for guiding the choice of bid levels is that a traditional measure named expected revenue sum does not work well in some cases. In particular, the expected revenue sum is defined as
, where m is the number of bid levels and P (li) is the probability that auction will close at bid level li. To choose the m optimal bid levels , the goal is to find m out of the W price levels such that the sum is maximized [8, 6, 7] . However, the bid levels chosen by using the expected revenue sum are not always guaranteed to be optimal. One drawback of using the expected revenue sum is that the resulting bid levels might be unnecessarily too fine. The other is that the resulting bid levels may not be optimal. Next we give an example to show the shortcomings of the measure expected revenue sum. EXAMPLE 1. Suppose there are 6 price levels v1 = 1, v2 = 2, v3 = 3, v4 = 4, v5 = 5 and v6 = 6, and we need to choose m = 2 bid levels from the 6 price levels. Also assume that the closing probabilities P (vi),i = 1, ..., 6 for the 6 prices levels are 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.18, 0.12 and 0.1, respectively. The reserve price is set to 0. According to the measure expected revenue sum, we compute the expected revenue for each price level through multiplying the closing probability by price level value, i.e., for v1 its expected revenue is 0.1 * 1 = 0.1. Similarly, the expected revenue for v2 to v6 are 0.4, 0.9, 0.72, 0.6 and 0.6 respectively. Following the measure, we choose v3 at first and then v4 since the two price levels maximize the expected revenue to 0.9+0.72 = 1.62. However, if v3 is chosen first, then v4 is not an optimal bid level to choose next. The first reason is that v4 is unnecessarily close to v3, which may introduce inefficiency into the auction. The second reason is for its low expected revenue increase. Based on our ERI scheme, when determining the first bid level, the ERI of v3 is (3−0) * (0.3+0.18+0.12+0.1) = 2.1, while ERIs for v1, v2, v4, v5, v6 are 1, 1.8, 1.6, 1.1, and 0.6 respectively.
Thus v3 is chosen as the first bid level since it will bring in the maximal expected revenue increase. When determining the second bid level, the ERIs for v1 is (1 − 0) * (0.1+ 0.2) = 0.3, v2 is (2−0) * 0.2 = 0.4, v4 is (4−3) * (0.18+0.12+0.1) = 0.4, v5 is (5 − 3) * (0.12 + 0.1) = 0.44 and v6 is (6 − 3) * 0.1 = 0.3. So v5 is going to be the second bid level for it yields the maximal expect revenue increase, 0.44, instead of v4 when using the expected revenue sum scheme.
Based on Example 1, the main intuition behind our greedy strategy is that at each step the price level which can produce the largest expected revenue increase is chosen as a bid level. The process repeats m times, each time picks the price level with the largest expected revenue increase among the rest, until all the bid levels are found (note that we set l0 = Vmin as the reserve price).
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In this section we present extensive experimental results to benchmark our scheme against two competitors -one is a basic scheme which is supposed to know the distribution form of bidder valuation and uses a strategy to evenly choose price levels around the most frequent valuation values; the other is a k-armed bandit scheme which also has been adopted in [9] to choose the reserve price.
We outline the experimental settings first. Since the goal of this paper is to choose bid levels, for ease of discussion we always set l0 (the reserve price) to Vmin. We assume the number of participating bidders to be uniformly distributed within range 2 to b (the maximum number of bidders). For bidder valuation range, we assume a continuous range Vmin = 0 and Vmax = 10, within which the bidder valuation is supposed to be uniformly, normally and exponentially distributed. All the experiments are based on these three different valuation distributions respectively. The normal valuation distribution is parameterized with mean (Vmax− Vmin)/2 and variance 0.2, the uniform and exponential valuation distributions are both over the range [Vmin, Vmax] (i.e., [0, 10] ). The number of price levels is fixed at 100 (i.e. W = 100) throughout this section, and they are evenly sliced from Vmin to Vmax (i.e., the set of price levels is {0.1, 0.2, ..., 9.9, 10}). Except for the experiment against different number of bid levels used, in the rest experiments the number of bid levels used is set to 10, i.e. m = 10 (note the first bid level l0 is reserve price and is set to Vmin = 0). All the experiment results are averaged over 10 episode of auctions, where each episode consists of N = 2000 auction rounds each of which simulates the process of auctioning an item.
PDF estimation when bidder valuation distribution is fixed
The standard Gaussian function is employed in our kernel method for estimating the closing price probability, and one could apply sophisticated technique to determine the best bandwidth h [15] . For simplicity, here we empirically set the bandwidth h to 0.8 according to [15] . The kernel method utilizes the past auction data (i.e. closing prices of the past auction rounds) to estimate the probability density of the closing prices. At the beginning of an auction episode, since there is no past data, we obtain these values by running mockup auctions till some pre-specified number of rounds named initial rounds IR. That is, for the first IR rounds, we set the m bid levels evenly (using the same method for setting bid levels in the basic competitor scheme) and record the closing prices for each of the IR auction rounds. Except the experiment on testing different IR values, the rest of the experiments reported below has IR set to 50.
We first present the results when the bidder valuation distribution remains unchanged throughout the auction episode. In Figures 3, 5 and 7 we present the estimated results using kernel method over exponentially, normally and uniformly distributed bidder valuation, respectively. Based on these estimated closing price probabilities, our greedy strategy is performed to choose bid levels. It yields the results over the three valuation distributions in Figures 4, 6 and 8 respectively, in which the bar represents the probability that the auction round would be closed at the corresponding price level based on the past observations. The lines with diamond markers in Figures 3, 5 and 7 represent the frequency (in percentage) of highest bidder valuation over each price levels. Since the bidder valuation is secret to the auctioneer who has no idea about the distribution, we reveal the highest bidder valuation so that we can compare the estimated closing price probability using kernel method with the true distribution of highest bidder valuation (note that highest bidder valuation affects the closing price, so we round the highest valuation to its floor price level such that the highest valuation distribution could be approximately observed through the frequency of corresponding price levels in the figures). Using the kernel method, the estimated probability of being a closing price for each price level, as depicted by the lines with circle markers, can well approximate the highest bidder valuation.
In Figures 4,6 and 8, we present frequency for each price level of being chosen as a bid level using our greedy strategy. The bars show that corresponding to each of the three valuation distributions, the frequencies of those price levels that are chosen as bid levels are approximating the shape of the highest valuation distribution in Figure 3 ,5 and 7, respectively. 
PDF estimation when bidder valuation distribution changes
In this section we present experiment results for dynamic situations when the bidder valuation changes from one dis- tribution to another during the auction episode. For example, bidder valuation may follow normal distribution in the first X auction rounds, and then changes to exponential distribution after X rounds. The change of bidder valuation distribution is meaningful in real world auctions, since bidder valuation may be affected by bidder's interest shifting or the supply of items being auctioned. For simplicity we set X to N 2 = 1000 rounds, that is bidder valuation distribution remains the same in the first half of an auction episode and then changes in the last half. In Figures 9 and 11 we present the estimation results using kernel method when bidder valuation distribution changes from normal to exponential, and from normal to uniform, respectively. The curves show that the kernel method is capable of modelling the closing price probability in face of a changing bidder valuation distribution. Correspondingly, in Figures 10 and 12 we give the result frequency for each price level, which represents the frequencies that each price level is chosen as a bid level.
Performance Comparison
In this section we present the performance comparisons between our method and two competitors in terms of the av- The second competitor is a k-armed bandit scheme which also has been adopted in [9] in choosing the reserve price. We also highlight the highest bidder valuation (this value is the upper bound of auctioneer revenue) in the results so that we can compare how close these three methods approach to the revenue upper bound. The number of participating bidders will greatly affect the auctioneer revenue, as has been studied in [6, 7, 9] . In order to show performances with different number of participating bidders, we vary the parameter b, the maximum number of bidders, with 2, 4, 8, 10, 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 and 200. Note that in our experiments the number of participating bidders is uniformly distributed within range [2, b] . From Figure  13 ,14 and 15, we can see that under the three distribution assumptions all three methods will achieve higher average revenue as the maximum number of bidders b increases. Our kernel method for choosing bid levels outperforms the two competitors consistently.
Next, we investigate how the number of bid levels affect the revenue. The number of bid levels m is crucial in auction, too many bid levels will be inefficient although a higher average revenue could be guaranteed; whereas few bid levels can finish the auction quickly with a lower average revenue [6, 7] . In our experiments, given the number of price levels W = 100 within [0, 10], we vary the number of bid levels m (except the reserve price level 0) with 2, 5, 8, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 respectively. From the results in Figures 16,  17 and 18, observe that the average revenue will increase with a larger number of bid levels. However, after a certain number of bid levels (about m = 20, i.e., 20/100 = 20% of the price levels are chosen as bid levels), the average revenue reaches a plateau for all three methods with normal Finally, we investigate the effect on the initial round number IR affects the average revenue. We set the IR value to 5, 10, 20, 50, 80, 100, 200 and 300 respectively, and present the results in Figure 19 , 20 and 21. We show that our kernel method works well with a small IR. The explanation is that we adopt the basic scheme in the first IR rounds to collect closing prices for our kernel method, whose performance is inferior to the kernel method as demonstrated in Figures 13,  14, 15 , 16, 17 and 18. If IR is set to be large, the final average revenue of the kernel method may drop slightly since the result is averaged over the first IR rounds.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we are concerned with the efficiency of choosing bid levels adaptively in a dynamic environment in which similar items are auctioned repeatedly. In an auction, the closing price is closely correlated with the highest bidder valuation, which is unknown to the auctioneer. To maximize revenue, the auctioneer needs to propose bid levels that can well capture the highest bidder valuation. To achieve this goal, first we employed a non-parametric kernel method to estimate the closing price probability based on previous auction data, and show that our approach is robust and accurate against changing bidder valuation. Based on the estimated closing price probability, a greedy strategy was devised to choose bid levels. We conducted extensive experiments for comparing our method with 2 other methods. The results demonstrate that our method is superior consistently to its competitors in terms of average revenue. In future work, we plan to compare our method with other existing schemes on choosing bid levels such as the one proposed in [6] using real datasets.
